Use cases · Communications & crisis
For communications and crisis teams
What is said about you where social listening does not reach, and since when. A crisis arrives on public networks; it does not start there.
Where your coverage stops
The line listening tools do not cross
Your current tools cover the surface web well. Informational risk, however, is prepared below: on extortion sites, marketplaces, .onion services — public, but not indexed by those tools.
Surface web · what your social listening already covers
- Press and blogs
- Public social networks
↓ where listening tools stop
Deep and dark webs · publicly accessible, and out of reach of the usual tools
- Extortion sites
- Marketplaces
- .onion services
- Paste sites
A crisis does not start on public networks: it arrives there. What precedes it is published below that line, on open sources the usual tools do not index — and which can be dated. The hours won there decide the rest.
Schematic. Aleph collects only publicly accessible sources, with no authentication and no infiltration, and does not perform content takedown.
The uses
What you gain
The hours of lead time
A claim posted on an extortion site precedes the press article. That delay is your preparation margin.
Knowing what actually got out
Before communicating on the scope of a leak, being able to say what is circulating, where, and since when.
Documenting afterwards
Reconstructing the chronology of an escalation for the debrief, and for next time.
What we do not do
Neither takedown nor brand protection
Getting content taken down is an execution business: teams, platform relationships, volume. It is not ours, and others do it better than we would.
Our contribution is upstream: the source, and its date. If your need is takedown at scale, we will say so — and where relevant we will work alongside whoever handles it.
See what circulates below the line
One search on your brand is enough to measure the gap with what your current tools surface.